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Abstract:  This paper explores the characteristics associated with the formation of bubbles 
that occurred in the Hong Kong stock market in 1997 and 2007, as well as the 2000 dot-com 
bubble in NASDAQ. It examines the profitability of Technical Analysis (TA) strategies 
generating buy and sell signals with knowing and without trading rules. The empirical results 
show that by applying long and short strategies during the bubble formation and short 
strategies after the bubble burst, it not only produces returns that are significantly greater than 
buy and hold strategies, but also produces greater wealth compared with TA strategies without 
trading rules. We conclude these bubble detection signals help investors generate greater 
wealth from applying appropriate long and short Moving Average (MA) strategies. 
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Sub-Prime Crisis and Asian Financial Crisis 
 
1. Introduction. 
The past two decades have witnessed three huge bubbles and crashes with deep and long bear 
markets, namely the uncontrolled exuberance during the 1990s followed by the Asian 
Financial Crisis, the dot-com bubble at the turn of the Century, and the bubble in the run up to 
the 2007 peak of over 30,000, followed by the crashes and bust after the bursting of the U.S. 
housing bubble. Many institutional investors suffered losses, in spite of well-established tests 
to detect bubbles in the stock market, namely excess volatility tests, cointegration tests, 
duration dependence tests, and the intrinsic bubbles model.  
 
If such well-established tests for the existence of bubbles are available, why do such bubbles 
occur? Why do most investors fail to avoid the bursting of bubbles by simply leaving the 
market early when signals, as suggested by these quantitative tests, purportedly detect the 
existence of a bubble. One possible explanation may be that even though investors may be 
fooled into buying an overpriced asset, they believe that the market is populated by greater 
fools who are willing to buy at an even higher price, the so-called “greater fool” theory. 
Mokhtar et al. (2006) suggest that such speculators know that stock prices have exceeded 
their fundamental value, but they still trade while thinking that the bubble will continue. 
Another possible explanation is that, in practice, these bubble detection techniques are too 
difficult and are not available to the average investor, who have no tools to detect the stock 
bubbles. Consequently, such investors are not able to leave early when these signals occur to 
avoid market crashes and bear markets, thereafter suffering huge losses. 
 
In this paper, we develop simple bubble detection signals that can be used by investors and 
regulators. We do so by analyzing the 1997 stock bubble of the Hang Seng Index (HIS), 2000 
dot-com bubble, and 2008 stock bubble of HSI. In sum, we identify four properties associated 
with the creation and bursting of bubbles, and they serve as selling signals for investors to 
leave the market early before the horrendous bursting of bubbles. The four properties are as 
follows: (1) the run-up of abnormally high returns in the formation of the bubble, (2) the 
deviation of stock price from one standard deviation trend line by more than 10%, (3) an 
increase in the volatility of stock returns, and (4) the decline in stock prices below the one 
standard deviation trend line. 
 
After identifying these four signals, we suggest a trading rule to profit from the bursting of a 
bubble. We assess the performance of different buy/sell rules, namely technical analysis tools 
from the moving average (MA) family, including simple MA rules, dual MA rules, exponential 
MA rules for the three bubbles to examine which strategies can help investors profit even 
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during bubble formation and bursting. Our findings show that MAs perform significantly 
better than the buy and hold (BH) strategy, even under transaction costs. In particular, we find 
that MA20 rule is able to generate the greatest wealth for investors. 
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature 
on speculative bubbles and technical analysis. Section 3 examines the four properties 
associated with the building up and bursting of a bubble, with empirical results from the 97, 
dot-com and 07 bubbles. The methodology in constructing the figures will be discussed. Then 
we suggest a trading rule to profit from the bursting of bubbles. In Section 4, different 
buy/sell strategies, including MA(5), MA(10), MA(20), MA(30), MA(50), DMA(5,20), 
DMA(5,30), EMA(5), EMA(10) and EMA(20), are examined. We recommend trading 
strategies for investors to avoid similar crashes and to capture investment opportunities.  
 
 
2. Literature Review. 
Technical analysis (TA) has a long history of identifying and moving with the trend. It goes 
back to the 1700s, when Japanese rice traders traded on the Dojima Rice Exchange. TA was 
used widely after the 1800s, with Charles Dow laying the foundation for modern technical 
analysis. Later it evolved into Chartism in the early 20th Century with mechanical trading 
rules to generate buy/sell signals. The advent of computers enabled analysts to combine 
fundamental economic data with price and volume data to produce new indicators.  
 
TA is applicable to stocks, indices, commodities, futures or any tradable instrument where 
prices are influenced by supply and demand. TA is used to analyse historical data on prices to 
determine future prices on the basis of trends. There are two groups of TA, namely 
trend-following indicators and counter-trend indicators. Wong et al. (2003) find that most of 
the counter-trend indicators do not perform well in signaling. Since the seminal work of 
Friedman (1953) and Fama (1970), TA as a forecasting tool has been controversial. Some 
literature has found that TA is not useful and cannot beat buy-and-hold strategies if 
transaction costs are incorporated. This is probably due to the fact there are periods when 
prices do not trend and fluctuate randomly (Schwager, 1995). The goal of Chartism is to 
identify periods of non-random major trends. 
 
Early empirical research by Roberts (1959) and Brealey (1969) present evidence supporting 
the weak form of market efficiency. Alexander (1961, 1964), the first to confirm the 
profitability of technical trading on individual US stocks, finds that profitability disappears 
when trading costs are introduced. Fama and Blume (1966), Jensen and Benington (1970), 
Fama (1970), and Fong and Yong (2005) observe some merit in TA. Fama and Blume (1966) 
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even find that returns could be negative under transaction costs. Their work is consistent with 
the efficient market hypothesis, which states that current price reflects all available 
information, including the past history of prices and trading volume, so that one cannot 
expect abnormal returns (Fama, 1970). Sweeney (1988) shows that filter rules similar to that 
of Fama and Blume (1966) can produce profits depending on the level of transaction costs. 
 
Many researchers (see Fama (1965) and Neftci (1991) among others) have concluded that TA 
is not able to predict future movements in the stock market, and that a simple buy-and-hold 
strategy outperforms trading rules. Isakov and Hollistein (1998) report that transaction costs 
eliminate technical trading profits in the Swiss stock market. They suggest conditions where 
large investors may profit from moving average trading rules. However, Frankel and Froot 
(1990) find that there was a shift from fundamentals to TA in the 1980s, and that market 
practitioners rely on TA in forecasting the market. Moreover, the prevalence of real time 
information services that provide detailed, comprehensive and up-to-date technical analysis 
information, such as Reuters and Telerate, suggests that TA is used widely.  
 
Mills (1997) analyses the trading rules using data from the London Stock Exchange FT30 
index for the period 1935-1994, and finds that the rules actually work for the most of the 
sample period, at least up to the 1980’s. However, these findings are also contradictory, as 
after the 1980’s the buy-and-hold strategy dominates the trading rule strategy. Chong and Ng 
(2008) reexamine the issue by using the same data set as Mills, but divide the data into three 
samples and review the RSI and MACD trading rules. They conclude that the RSI and 
MACD trading rules are able to out-perform the buy-and-hold strategy, and find that this 
conclusion is robust to their choice of the sample period. The returns for the trading rules are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Other research concludes that TA contains significant 
forecasting power, and that analysts can identify a trend that can be exploited during the 
sluggish adjustment of stock price to fundamental supply and demand phenomena.  
 
Wong et al. (2003) conclude that TA can be useful, and calculate test statistics which suggest 
that both MA and RSI indicators pass the tests in generating significant positive returns. 
Ratner and Leal (1999) estimate the efficacy of using technical trading rules (10 variable 
length moving averages) in emerging markets of Latin America and Asia. The results 
demonstrate on average that superior profits after estimated trading costs can be achieved by 
technical trading rules over a simple buy and hold strategy only in certain countries, 
specifically Mexico, Taiwan and Thailand. The profitability of technical trading rules in 
emerging markets may be associated with the persistence of returns, or autocorrelation, in 
these markets. Harvey (1995a) finds that the autocorrelation in emerging markets is much 
higher than in developed markets. Harvey (1995b) contends that emerging market returns 
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seem to be predictable when using international and local risk factors.  
 
Balvers et al. (1990) find that stock returns can be predicted using national aggregate output. 
Campbell (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b), Fama and French (1989); and Breen 
et al. (1990) find that stock returns can be predicted to a large degree by the PE ratio, 
dividend yields, business conditions and economic variables. Lo et al. (2000) find that US 
share prices over the period 1962-1996 are unusually recurrent. Although they do not show 
that the patterns are predictable enough to make sufficient profits to justify the risks, the 
authors conclude that this is possible. Wong et al. (2005) conclude that in the Shanghai, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan stock exchanges, TA outperforms a buy-and-hold strategy, and that the 
cumulative wealth obtained also surpasses that of the buy-and-hold strategy under transaction 
costs. The conclusion is that the Greater China stock markets, in general, are not efficient.  
 
Other work by Allen and Taylor (1990) and Neftci (1991) find that simple TA has significant 
forecasting power. Brock et al. (1992) demonstrate that a relatively simple set of technical 
trading rules possesses significant forecasting power for changes in the DJIA over a long 
sample period. However, Ready (1997) finds that, apart from the earlier sub-period 
1970-1974, MV generally underperforms the buy and hold strategy. Bessembinder and Chan 
(1998) find that the Brock et al. (1992) trading rules can be profitable in some Asian 
countries when trading costs are considered. Hudson et al. (1996) find that the Brock et al. 
(1992) trading rules have some ability to predict the FT30 series of returns, but that no 
significant gains are found after factoring in trading costs.  
 
Kung and Wong (2009a) conduct an analysis using two popular trading rules, namely MA and 
TRB, to assess whether or not the gradual liberalization of Taiwan’s securities markets has 
improved the efficiency of its stock market. The results show that the two rules have 
considerable predictive power for 1983-1990; become less predictive for 1991-1997; and 
cannot predict the market for 1998-2005. These results indicate that the efficiency of the 
Taiwan stock market has been greatly enhanced by the liberalization measures implemented 
over the last 20 years. 
 
In spite of the multitude of published papers on TA, only a few have addressed bubbles and 
downturns. Wong et al. (2001) examine whether buy/sell signals generated from the E/P ratio 
and bond yield could help investors avoid market crashes and beat the stock market. They 
conclude that the trading signals from the indicator can enable investors to escape from most 
of the crashes and catch most of the bull runs, thereby generating significant profits. Other 
attempts include Fisher and Statman (2003), who find that consumer confidence are able to 
predict some stock returns when predicting Nasdaq and small cap stock returns. They find a 
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negative and statistically significant relationship between the level of the expectations 
component of the Conference Board confidence in one month in Nasdaq and small cap stocks 
in the following month. However, they do not find the same relationship to be statistically 
significant when considering the S&P 500 index. 
 
In addition, Lam et al. (2007) examine whether a day’s surge or plummet in stock price can 
serve as a market entry or exit signal. They find that the trading rules perform well in the 
Asian indices but not in those of Europe and the USA. In the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis, a series of reform and liberalization measures have been implemented in Singapore to 
upgrade its financial markets. Kung and Wong (2009b) investigate whether these measures 
have led to less profitability for those investors who employ technical rules for trading stocks. 
They find that the three trading rules consistently generate higher annual returns for 
1988-1996 than those for 1999-2007. Furthermore, they generally perform better than the 
buy-and-hold strategy for 1988-1996, but perform no better than the buy-and-hold strategy 
for 1999-2007. These findings suggest that the efficiency of the Singapore stock market has 
been considerably enhanced by the measures implemented after the crisis.  
 
Wong and McAleer (2009) examine the Presidential election cycle and find that stock prices 
fall during the first half of a Presidency, reach a trough in the second year, rise during the 
second half of a Presidency, and reach a peak in the third or fourth year. They also find that 
the Republican Party may have greater cause to engage in active policy manipulation to win 
re-election than their Democratic counterparts.  
 
This paper is similar to Wong et al. (2005) in that we use simple TA tools, including the 
moving regression lines, and indicators such as stock returns and volatility to signal the 
formation and bursting of financial bubbles in HSI during 1997, 2008 and Nasdaq during 
2000. The paper also examines different technical trading rules to see which strategy is able 
to generate the greatest wealth for investors.  
 
 
3. Four Properties Common to the 97, dot-com and 07 Bubbles. 
 
Property 1. Accumulation of abnormally high returns. 
We first consider the 97 bubble. Tables 1-2 shows that during the 2-year period before the 4 
months preceding the peak of the 97 bubble, the ratio of the number of days with positive 
returns to the number of days of negative returns of the HSI daily index is around 53:47. 
However, in the 4 months preceding the 97 peak, the ratio increases to 59:40, a significant 
increase in the proportion of days with positive returns. A similar pattern is seen in the 
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dot-com bubble, with the ratio for Nasdaq daily returns increasing from 56:44 to 68:32 for the 
5 months preceding the 2000 peak. A similar increase in the ratio is seen for the 07 bubble. 
The ratio increases from 56.7:42.1 for the period June 10, 2005 to June 11, 2007 to 58.4:37.6 
for the 4 months preceding the 07 peak.  
 
As for the size of returns, for the 97 bubble, the average daily return for HSI in the 2-year 
period before the 4 months preceding the 97 peak is merely 0.06%, but it increases to 0.40% 
for the 4 months before the 97 peak. The annualized return for the same 2-year period is just 
16.7%, but it increases sharply to over 118.1% for the 4 months preceding the 97 peak. For 
the dot-com bubble, the average daily returns for NASDAQ in the 2 years before 5 months 
preceding the 00 peak is about 0.11%, but then it increases five times to 0.43%, with the 
annualized return for the corresponding period increasing from 44% to about 221% (see 
Tables 3-4 for further details). For the 07 bubble, the average daily return of HSI for the 
2-year period preceding 4 months before the 07 peak is merely 0.08%, which then increases 
significantly to 0.43% for the 4 months before the 07 peak. The annualized return for the 
same 2-year period is merely 24.1%, compared to 133.4% in the 4 months preceding the 07 
peak. 
 
These results are not particularly surprising. In order to compensate for the possibility of a 
bubble bursting, investors would require higher returns during a bubble than during normal 
times. These two facts constitute the first property of bubble formation, namely a significant 
increase in the ratio of the number of days with positive returns to the number of days with 
negative returns for the 4 months preceding the peak of a bubble, as well as abnormally high 
returns for the 4 months preceding the peak of a bubble. 
 
Property 2. Peak rises more than 10% above +1SD trend. 
We plot the time series for the three bubbles examined in this paper. In order to construct 
these figures, we choose a low point in the preceding dominant upward trend; that is, July 14, 
1995 in Figure 1A for the 97 bubble, August 31, 1998 in Figure 1B for the dot-com bubble, 
and March 5, 2007 in Figure 1C for the 07 bubble. Thereafter, we obtain the prediction price 
for a certain day by regressing stock price at time t using the data from the starting point to 
time t-1. In order to do so for each time t, we construct the moving linear regression line. 
 
For the 97 bubble, on 7/8/97, the HSI reaches its peak of 16,673, which is far beyond the 
+1SD prediction line by 10%. As for the dot-com bubble, the rise is more pronounced, with 
the NASDAQ rising above the +1SD prediction line by more than 17% on 10/3/00. A similar 
result is seen in the 07 case. On 30/10/07, the HSI reaches its peak of 31,638.22, which is far 
above the +1SD prediction line by 11%. 
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Hence, properly 2 of a bubble is that the peak of the index could rise beyond the +1SD 
prediction line from the moving linear regression by 10% or more. 
 
Property 3. Increase in volatility. 
The third property associated with the formation of a bubble is an increase in the volatility of 
stock returns, where return refers to log return. The volatility is simply the standard deviation 
of log returns for a specified period. During a bubble formation, prices rise beyond their 
fundamental value and are no longer driven by objective new information, and hence are 
expected to be more volatile than during normal periods. This is consistent with tests on 
volatility to detect systematic departure of stock prices from fundamental values.  
 
For the 97 bubble, the volatility is around 0.01 for the 2-year period before the 4 months 
preceding the 97 peak, which suddenly increases to over 0.012 for the half year before the 97 
peak, representing an increase of 20%. A similar pattern is seen for the dot-com bubble, with 
the volatility increasing from 0.18 in the 2-year period before the 3 months preceding the 
2000 peak to 0.23 in the 3 months preceding the 2000 peak. The change is more pronounced 
for the 07 bubble. Initially, for the 2-year period before the 4 months preceding the 07 peak, 
the volatility is around 0.01. Then for the 4 months preceding the 07 peak, volatility increases 
by over 50% to 0.017 (see Table 3 for details). 
 
Property 4. Falling below the -1SD prediction line. 
Referring to Figure 1, signaling the bursting of the 97 bubble is the index dropping below the 
-1SD trend line on 9/10/97. Thereafter, the HSI falls by 37% for the 19 days after the HSI 
drops below the -1SD trend line. For the following year, the index drops by 53%, which is a 
deep and long recession. For the dot-com bubble (Figure 2), the Nasdaq drops below the 
trend line on 11/9/00. Thereafter, the index falls from 4048 to 3075 on 12/10/00, representing 
a decrease of 32% in just 1 month, and the index drops by 58% for the 6 months after the 
index crossed the -1SD trend line. For the 07 bubble (Figure 3), the HSI drops below the 
trend line on 21/11/07. Subsequently, 2.5 months later, the HSI drops from 27,616 on 9/1/08 
to 21,758 on 22/1/08, representing a decrease of over 20% in just 13 days. For the 1 year after 
the index drops below the -1SD trend line, the index drops by 59%, which is even larger than 
the 97 bubble. 
 
Having identified the patterns in stock prices associated with the formation and bursting of 
bubbles, in the following we suggest a trading rule to profit from bubbles, and then examine 
different TA strategies to investigate whether this trading rule can help investors generate 
greater profits than without this trading rule. 
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Trading rule condition. 
For a period of no less than 4 months: 
1. The percentage of the number of days with positive returns minus the percentage of the 
number of days with negative returns increases by more than 7 percentage points. 
2. The annualized return for the period increases over 100%. 
3. The Peak of the stock price rises over the +1SD trend line by more than 10%. 
4. More than 20% increase in volatility.  
 
If the above 4 conditions occur, then we suggest turning to MA short strategies when the 
stock price drops below the stock price regression line, until the stock price breaks a 
dominant downward trend. 
 
 
4. Technical Indicators. 
Moving Average (MA) is the most commonly used trend indicator. There are many studies 
regarding the performance of MA, but the findings are not consistent. For example, Brock, et 
al. (1992) show that MA significantly outperforms a cash benchmark when applied to the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average. However, Ready (1997) finds that, apart from the earliest 
sub-period (1970-1974), MA generally underperforms the buy-and-hold strategy. More 
recently, Wong, et al. (2003) support the usefulness of the MA strategy. On the other hand, 
Fong and Yong (2005) examine various MA rules and conclude there is no evidence of 
significant trading profits. In this paper, we adopt  the Moving Average strategy to examine 
whether we can profiteer from the bubbles we studies in our paper by investigating the 
following MA rules: simple Moving Average (MA), simple Exponential Moving Average 
(EMA), and Dual Moving Average (DMA). These strategies are described briefly below. 
 
1. Simple Moving Average. 
The n-day simple Moving Average (MA) at time t, denoted by ,t nMA , is given by: 
1
,
1 t
t n i
i t n
MA C
n

 
   ,                 (1) 
where iC  is the closing price at time i. A moving average changes in response to the 
addition of a new period and the shedding of the oldest period. As the calculation continues, 
the n-day moving average increases when the closing price moves upwards as the added 
value is larger than the deleted value. In a simple MA procedure, a buy signal is generated 
when the closing price rises above MA and a sell signal is generated when the close falls 
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below MA. As moving averages are lagging indicators, they are trend following. If a clear 
trend exists, this method should work adequately. However, if the market is moving sideways 
or if there is excessive volatility, there could be many false signals. In such cases, Bollinger 
Bands and the MA Channels may be better trading tools than the use of Moving Averages 
(Leung and Chong, 2003). 
 
2. Exponential Moving Average. 
In order to reduce the lag effect from the ‘outdated’ data in simple moving averages, the 
exponential moving average strategy has been developed. The n-day Exponential Moving 
Average (EMA) at time t, denoted by ,t nEMA , is defined as: 
             nttnt
E M ACE M A ,1, )1(             
(2) 
with 1,1 CEMA n  . In equation (2), 
1
2


n
 . In addition, the first few ,t nEMA   values will 
be deleted so that the initial value for ,t nEMA  will not affect ,t nEMA . 
Exponential moving averages reduce the lag effect from the ‘outdated’ data by assigning 
greater weight to more recent prices. The smoothing constant 2/(n+1) in formula (2) works as 
the weight that applies to the most recent price depending on the length of the moving 
average. The shorter is the exponential moving average, the greater is the weight that will be 
assigned to the most recent price. For example: a 10-period exponential moving average 
would weight the most recent price 18.18%, and a 20-period exponential moving average 
would weight the most recent price 9.52%.  
 
EMA will react faster to recent price changes than will a simple moving average.  The EMA 
formula works by weighting the difference between the price in the current period and the 
EMA in the previous period, and then updating the result of the EMA in the previous period. 
The diagram below shows the formation of the buy and sell signals by the use of the MA 
strategy (either MA or EMA). 
 
A buy signal is generated when the closing price passes the EMA from below, and a sell 
signal is generated when the closing price passes the EMA from above. As in the case of MA, 
the effectiveness of EMA is also undermined by excessive volatilities in stock prices. 
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3. Dual Moving Average. 
Another commonly used trading rule (see Brock et al., 1992) is the Dual MA (DMA) strategy, 
denoted by DMA(n,m), that consists of two MAs: a ‘short’ n-day MA, ,t nMA , and a ‘long’ 
m-day MA, ,t mMA , with m > n. The rule generates a buy (sell) signal when the short MA rises 
above (falls below) the long MA. The common DMA rules are 1-5, 1-200, 5-10, 5-20, 5-30 
and 5-200. When the DMA is formed by two EMAs, we call it Dual Exponential Moving 
Average (DEMA), denoted by DEMA(n,m). As in the case of DMA, there are two EMAs: a 
‘short’ n-day EMA, ,t nEMA , and a ‘long’ m-day EMA, ,t mEMA  , with m > n. The rule for the 
DEMA signals is the same as that of the DMA. The 5-20 day and 5-30 day DMA and DEMA 
strategies are examined in this paper. 
 
Unlike simple MA and EMA, DMA is less affected by excess volatilities on certain days due 
to the smoothing effect of the short MA. 
 
 
5. Strategies With and Without Trading Rules. 
The data used in this paper are the daily closing values of the Nasdaq and the Hang Seng 
Index (HSI) extracted from Yahoo.com/finance. The three periods, namely NASDAQ August 
31, 1998 to September 9, 2002 , HSI July 14, 1995 to August 31, 1998, and HSI March 5, 
2007 to March 31, 2009, will be used to examine different trading strategies. For each period, 
they will be further divided into two periods, namely before and after the bursting of bubbles, 
which are identified by the times when the stock price passes below the moving regression 
line from the peak. The six periods are NASDAQ August 31, 1998 to April 12, 2000, 
NASDAQ April 12, 2000 to September 9, 2002, HSI July 14, 1995 to September 1, 1997, 
Illustration on Moving Average  
stock index MA  
BUY 
Sell BUY 
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HSI September 1, 1997 to August 31, 1998, HSI March 5, 2007 to November 15, 2007, and 
HSI November 15, 2007 to March 31, 2009.  
 
Under our trading rule, we adopt the MA long only strategy during bubble formation, and for 
the period after the stock price dropped below the stock price regression line signaling the 
bursting of the bubble, we will adopt the MA short only strategy. In order to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the proposed bubble detection signals, we will compare the above-mentioned 
strategy with trading rule with the MA strategy without a trading rule. Without a trading rule, 
we will adopt the MA long and short strategy throughout the whole period.  
 
As a strategy under the proposed trading rule, the MA short strategy is adopted when the four 
properties mentioned in Section 3 are satisfied, starting when the stock indexes fall below the 
moving linear regression lines from their peaks, until the end of the bear run. In Figure 1, for 
the 97 bubble, a trend line is drawn to pass through A, B and C, so that the end point of the 
bear run is around August 31, 1998. In Figure 2, for the 07 bubble, a trend line is drawn to 
pass through A, B and C, so that the end point is around March 31, 2009. For the dot-com 
bubble, as shown in Figure 3, a trend line is drawn to pass through A, B and C, so that the end 
point for the bear run is around September 9, 2002. After the end point C in Figures 1, 2 and 
3, the stock indexes turn bull, and the short strategy is no longer profitable. 
 
Hypothesis Testing for long strategies. 
The closing prices of the indexes are used to compute the daily returns, tr , such that tr  = 
100*Ln ( tC / 1tC  ), where tC  is the closing price of the index on day t. Suppose at time t 
there is a buy (sell) signal, and at time t nt  there is a sell (buy) signal, and form the long 
(short) trading strategy. The aggregate return , tt nS  will be given as 
,
1
t
t
n
t n t i
i
S r

  .            (3) 
Without loss of generality, we denote , tt nS as S t . Suppose we have the buy (sell) signals at t1, 
t2, …, tm , let  = { t1, t2, …, tm}, and define   to be the set of all these trading returns such 
that ii I  , where the { iI } are the disjoint sets of returns generated by the i
th
 buy 
(sell) signals (namely, buy (sell) at time ti and sell (buy) at time ti + ni). Let n = N( ) be the 
number of elements in the set  , r  be the vector of all returns in  , and 1  be the 
nx1 vector of unit elements. Assume that the mean vector and covariance matrix of r are 
 and  , respectively.  
 
14 
 
If   is the set of all the daily returns generated by buy signals, let longr , 
long , 
long
 , 
and nlong correspond to r ,  ,  , and n, respectively. Similarly, if  is the set of all the 
daily returns generated by sell signals, let shortr , 
short , 
short
  and nshort  correspond 
to r ,  ,  , and n, respectively. 
longr  is the vector of daily returns for the long 
strategy generated by the indicator MAt , while 
shortr  is the vector of daily returns for the 
short strategy generated by the indicator. Further define
long and short  as the population 
means of daily returns generated by the buy and sell signals, respectively. 
 
The null hypothesis  
H01 : 0long   against  H11 : 0long         (4) 
is used to test whether the return is profitable for the long strategy. On the other hand, the null 
hypothesis  
H02 : 0short   against  H12 : 0short        (5) 
is used to test whether the return is profitable for the short strategy. Statistics applied to test 
whether the buy and sell signals generated by the family of MA yield significantly positive 
returns for either the long and short strategies are given by:  
 
1
ˆ1 1
1 /
T
T
T
r
T
r r n
 
  
 



                                          (6) 
where r , r  and   are longr , 
longr  and 
long
 respectively if it is used to test (4) and 
are shortr
shortr  and 
short
  respectively if it is used to test (5).  
 
We also report the mean return difference, also known as the buy-sell spread between the 
long and short strategy.  
 
The hypothesis 
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H03 : 0   against  H11 : 0   
 
Where 

 is the mean return of using both long and short strategies. 
 
The t-statistic for testing whether using both long and short strategies is profitable  is 
2 2/ /
long short
long long short short
r r
T
n n 



.          (7) 
The test statistic T will be approximately distributed as N(0,1) if   (
long and short ) is 0. 
In estimating ˆ  , we set the entries to be zero if they are not significant at the 5% level.  
 
For example, for the Taiwan stock market data for the simple MA(5) long strategy, the only 
significant autocorrelations are at lags 1, 3 and 4, with values of -0.078, -0.090 and -0.073, 
respectively. Thus, in testing this rule for Taiwan data, we set all entries to be zero except 
autocorrelations at lags 1, 3 and 4.  
 
Because n is very large,  T will approach the standard normal distribution by virtue of the 
Central Limit Theorem. Thus, the profit generated by using the MAt strategy is significantly 
greater than zero if  



 positionshort  ain          -z 
position long ain           z> 


T
T
                          (7) 
where z   is the critical value such that   = P(Z > z  ) and Z follows the standardized 
normal distribution.  
 
Nonetheless, it is well known that the daily return is not i.i.d. (independent and identical 
distributed), and it is also not normal (see, for example, Fama, 1965; Fama and French, 1988). 
It is useful to refer to Lo and MacKinlay (1990) for the violation of the normality assumption, 
and Conrad and Kaul (1988) for the violation of the independence assumption for daily 
returns. In order to accommodate the possibility that the Central Limit Theorem is not 
effective for our data set, we use a bootstrap technique (Hall, 1992) in the empirical analysis 
to check for normality. The results obtained from the bootstrap approach are very close to 
those obtained by assuming the statistic T to approach the standard normal distribution. Thus, 
we only report the results obtained by the latter method. 
16 
 
 
In order to check whether any of the moving average approaches significantly outperforms 
the BH strategy, we let BHr  and BH  be the sample and population means of daily returns, 
respectively, for the BH strategy, and use r  and n as defined in (6). Recall that r  is equal 
to longr  if   is generated by the buy signals, and is equal to shortr  if   is generated by 
the sell signals. Let  (
long and short ) be the mean and 
2 ( 2long and 
2
short ) the 
variance of tr , respectively. Then we have 
2 1 1 /T n     , where 1 1
T
    is defined in 
(6). In order to check whether any of the moving average approaches significantly 
outperforms the BH strategy, it is necessary to test whether the return, 
long , generated by 
the long strategy using the MA family is significantly greater than the return, BH , using the 
BH strategy.  
 
The analysis described above is used to test the null hypothesis  
H03 : long BH    against  H13 : long BH   .         (8) 
Similarly, the null hypothesis 
H04 : short BH   against  H14 : short BH            (9) 
is used to test whether the return, short , generated by the short strategy using the MA family 
is significantly greater than the return, BH , obtained from using the BH strategy. 
Let ( , )TBHR r r ,   represents the variance matrix of R , and introduce the following test 
statistic to test whether a long or short strategy using the buy and sell signals generated by the 
MA family significantly outperforms the BH strategy:  
 T' ≈
T
T
a R
a a
               (10) 
where (1, 1)
Ta   . 
 
The statistic T' should approach the standard normal distribution by virtue of the Central 
Limit Theorem as the sample size is very large in this paper. As discussed above, in order to 
accommodate the possibility that the Central Limit Theorem is not effective for our data set, 
we use a bootstrap technique in the empirical analysis to check for normality. The results 
obtained from the bootstrap approach are very close to those obtained by assuming the 
statistic T to approach the standard normal distribution. Thus, we only report the results 
obtained by the latter method. 
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The buy/sell strategy is significantly profitable if 
T z   in a long position 
T z   in a short position. 
The buy/sell strategy is significantly better than the buy/hold strategy if 
'T z  for both long and short positions. 
The statistics T and T’ will be applied to the aforementioned six periods for the three bubble 
periods.  
 
Wealth analysis. 
In addition to evaluating the performance of these TA strategies, we have also created a 
portfolio with an initial amount of $1M local currency to compare the performance of 
different strategies. As trading costs are not negligible in buy/sell strategies, it is necessary to 
take them into account. The cost of trading varies across countries. For Hong Kong, investors 
pay a stamp duty of 0.1%, as well as a small amount for commission, transaction levy, 
transfer fee, trading fee, and a transfer deed fee. For the USA, the trading fee normally ranges 
from US$9.99 to US$19.99. For simplicity, we will impose a transaction cost of 0.1% in both 
cases.  
 
 
6. Empirical Results. 
First, we will describe market returns for the full three periods, namely NASDAQ 
31/8/98-9/9/02, HSI 14/7/95-31/8/98, and HSI 5/3/07-31/3/09 (see Table 5). These are the 
returns that investors would receive from a buy/hold strategy. Hence, the t-value could be 
used to test whether the buy/hold strategy could generate significant returns for the three 
periods.  
 
As shown in Table 6, for all three periods, the BH strategy did not generate significantly 
positive returns in any of the three periods and actually it gives negative returns. Hence, it is 
necessary to find strategies other than a buy/hold strategy to generate profits from the bull 
and bear runs. As will be shown below, TA strategies not only generate significantly positive 
returns, but they could also generate a significant amount of wealth from active buying and 
selling strategies. 
 
Returns analysis from TA strategies under trading rules. 
Under a trading rule, a long and short strategy is adopted during a bubble formation, and a 
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short strategy is adopted after the stock price passes through the stock price regression line 
from the peak. Tables 5 to 7 report the average daily returns, and the corresponding test 
statistics, T, under the trading rule for the 3 periods. The difference between the returns from 
the TA and BH strategies is also computed, showing the test statistics T’, as well as the 
corresponding p-values. In addition, the total numbers of holding days (N) generated by 
different strategies are also shown. 
 
In Table 7, it is found that most MA rules generate positive returns that are significant at the 
5% level, so that we can conclude that all MA rules provide positive returns for the period 
HSI 14/7/95-1/9/97. The difference between the returns generated by the MA rule and BH 
strategy are all positive, with most being significant at the 5% level. Hence, we conclude that 
MA rules outperform the BH strategy for the period HSI 14/7/95-1/9/97. In Table 8, we find 
that the average daily returns from the MA strategy under our trading rule are all positive, and 
most are significant at the 5% level. Hence, we conclude that the MA rules provide 
significantly positive returns for the period NASDAQ 31/8/98-12/4/00. Moreover, the 
difference between the average daily return generated by the MA rules and the BH strategy 
are all positive, and all are significant at the 10% level. Hence, we conclude that all the MA 
rules outperform the BH strategy for the period NASDAQ 31/8/98-12/4/00. 
 
From Table 9, all the MA rules generate positive returns, and most are significant at the 10% 
level, so we can conclude that all the MA rules generate positive returns for the period HSI 
5/3/07-15/11/07. The difference between the returns from all the MA rules and BH strategy 
are all positive, and all are significant at the 10% level, so that we conclude that all MA rules 
outperform the BH strategy for the period HSI 5/3/07-15/11/07. 
 
TA strategies without our trading rule. 
In Tables 8 to10, we also report the returns from TA strategies without signaling the bubble, 
that is, we adopt long and short strategies throughout the three entire periods. In Table 10, 
during HSI 14/7/1995-31/8/98, most of the MA families were able to generate returns that are 
significant at the 10% level, with most being significant at the 5% level. Hence, we conclude 
that MA families are able to generate significantly positive returns for the period HSI 
14/7/95-31/8/98. However, the difference between the returns from long and short and BH 
strategies are not significant at the 10% level, so that we can conclude that long and short 
strategies are not able to beat the BH strategy for the period HSI 14/7/95-31/8/98.  
 
In Table 11 most the MA families are not able to generate significantly positive returns for the 
period Nasdaq31/8/98-9/9/02. Moreover, the difference between the long and short and BH 
strategies are not significant at the 10% level, so that we conclude that MA families cannot 
19 
 
beat the BH strategy for Nasdaq 31/8/98-9/9/02. In Table 12, most of the MA families did not 
generate returns that are significant at the 10% level. However, the difference between returns 
from the long and short and BH strategies are significant at the 1% level, so that we conclude 
that long and short strategies are able to beat the BH strategy for the sample given in HSI 
5/3/07-31/3/09. 
 
Wealth analysis with and without trading rules. 
In order to complete the empirical analysis, we establish a portfolio with initial amount of 
$1M in the beginning of the three periods, namely HSI 14/7/95-31/8/98, NASDAQ 
31/8/98-9/9/02, and HSI 5/3/07-31/3/09. With a trading rule, during the bull run (from the 
beginning to the point where the stock price dropped below the moving regression line from 
the peak), we adopt long and short only strategies using the MA family. Thereafter, we adopt 
short only strategies using the MA family. For comparison, we also establish the same 
portfolio for the BH strategy. The results are shown in Tables 11 to 13.  
 
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our bubble detection signals, we also show the 
wealth without a trading rule. As given in Tables 11 to 13, MA strategies with a trading rule 
are able to beat MA strategies without a trading rule by 4% to 68%. 
 
Comparing the MA strategies with and without trading rules, under a 0.1% transaction cost 
scenario, under our trading rule the MA strategies are able to outperform the MA strategies 
without a trading rule by 4% to 68%. Hence, we conclude that our bubble detection signals are 
able to help investors generate greater wealth. 
 
In Table 13, the most profitable strategies are MA5, 10, 20, DMA(5, 20) EMA5 with trading rule. 
From an initial amount of $1M, the investment grew to more than $2.2M in just 3 years. In Table 
14, the most profitable strategies are MA20, DMA(5,30) and EMA20, whereby a $1M initial 
investment has increased to more than $2.4M in just 4 years. In Table 15, the most profitable 
strategies are MA20, MA30, DMA(5,20), DMA(5,30) and EMA20, such that an initial 
investment of $1M grew to more than $1.8M in just 2 years.  
 
In Tables 11 to 13, we also report the wealth generated from TA strategies without trading rules, 
that is, we adopt long and sell strategies throughout the three periods. In Table 13, the greatest 
wealth of up to 2.29M is generated from MA(5), which is 10% smaller than the 2.52M generated 
from the same TA strategies under our trading rule. In Table 14, the greatest wealth up to 2.39M is 
generated from EMA(20), which is 16% below the 2.78M wealth generated from a trading rule 
and adopted short strategies after the bubble burst. In Table 15, the greatest wealth is generated 
from MA30, generating 2.08M, compared with 2.25M by the same TA strategies under our 
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trading rule.  
 
In short, all MA strategies can generate significant returns, and all are able to outperform the BH 
strategies. In all three cases, MA20 consistently produces a significant amount of wealth using 
long strategies during bull runs and short strategies during bear runs. Moreover, comparing the TA 
strategies with knowing and without trading rules, the former is able to beat the latter 
substantially, so that the signaling of a bubble can help investors generate significant wealth. 
 
 
7. Conclusion. 
In summary, there are four primary properties associated with the formation and bursting of 
bubbles. The first three are about the formation of bubbles, and the fourth one signals the day of 
reckoning when the bubble bursts. For investors with a long position in the stock market, a 
conservative strategy that might be advised is as follows: if the first three patterns emerge, and 
the HSI drops below the moving regression line (by then the stock price would have dropped by 
more than 10% from its peak), then investors should sell their stocks to avoid market crashes as 
well as a deep and long bear market.  
This is consonant with the idea that nobody invests in a financial bubble after it has burst. Most 
investors should have sold their shares when the index dropped below the -1SD trend line, by 
which time a market crash is highly likely, to be followed by a deep and long bear market. For 
aggressive investors, to generate the greatest wealth, they can adopt MA20 long and short 
strategies during bull runs, and MA20 short strategies after the stock price has dropped below the 
moving regression line from the peak, until the stock price breaks a dominant downward trend. 
As the analyses presented above shows, such strategies generate greater wealth than do BH 
strategies and simple TA strategies which adopted long and short strategies for the entire period.  
From the above, we conclude that TA analysis is not only useful in normal times, as shown in 
Wong et al. (2005), but TA strategies are also useful during the formation of bubbles and market 
crashes. This is not surprising as the market is regarded as highly inefficient when bubbles form, 
such that the stock price no longer depends on fundamentals. By applying technical indicators, 
investors can ride the trends to generate greater wealth during bubble formation and subsequent 
crashes.  
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Table 1. 
Stock Returns before the Bubble, and during the Bull Runs and Bear Markets of the Bubble. 
 Period % of positive 
returns 
% of negative 
returns 
average daily 
returns 
returns for the period 
(annualized) 
97 Bubble 
July 17, 1995 to  
April 29, 1997  52.60% 47.40% 0.06% 16.70%   
April 29, 1997 to  
August 7, 1997 59.40% 40.60% 0.40% 118.10%   
July 7, 1995 to 
August 13, 1998  51.10% 48.90% -0.05% -10.40%   
dot-com bubble 
January 2, 1997 to 
October 19, 1999 56.50% 43.50% 0.11% 44.40%   
October 19, 1999 
ToMarch 10, 2000 68.00% 32.00% 0.63% 221.30%   
August 31, 1998to 
September 9, 2002 53.40% 46.60% 0.00% 0.30%   
07 Bubble 
June 13, 2005 to  
June 11, 2007 56.70% 42.10% 0.08% 24.10%   
June 11, 2007 to 
October 30, 2007 58.40% 37.60% 0.43% 133.40%   
June 10, 2005 to 
March 9, 2009  53.00% 45.20% -0.02% -6.10%   
The table shows the percentage of days with positive and negative returns, the average daily returns 
and returns for the period (annualized) for the periods before and during the bubble formation. 
Table 2:  Volatility of log returns. 
97 bubble dot-com bubble 07 bubble 
HIS NASDAQ HSI 
Period 
Volatility of 
log return 
Period 
Volatility of 
log return 
Period 
Volatility of 
log return 
July 17, 1995 to 
April 29, 1997 0.01 
August 31, 1998 to 
January 4, 2000 0.018 
June 13, 2005 to 
June 11, 2007 0.009 
February 10, 1997 
to August 7, 1997 0.012 
January 4, 2000 to 
March 10, 2000 0.024 
June 11, 2007 to 
October 30,2007 0.017 
The table shows the volatility of stock returns before and during the bubble formation. 
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Table 3. 
Stock Returns before the Bubble,  
and During the Bull Runs and Bear Markets of the Bubble 
 
 Period 
% of 
positive 
returns 
% of negative 
returns 
average daily 
returns 
returns for the period 
(annualized) 
97 Bubble 
July 17, 1995 to  
April 29, 1997  52.6% 47.4% 0.06% 16.7% 
April 29, 1997 to  
August 7, 1997  59.4% 40.6% 0.40% 118.1% 
July 7, 1995 to 
August 13, 1998  51.1% 48.9% -0.05% -10.4% 
Dot-com bubble 
January 2, 1997 to 
October 19, 1999  56.5% 43.5% 0.11% 44.4% 
October 19, 1999 to  
March 10, 2000 68.0% 32.0% 0.63% 221.3% 
August 31, 1998 to 
September 9,2002  53.4% 46.6% 0.00% 0.3% 
07 Bubble 
June 13, 2005 to  
June 11, 2007 56.7% 42.1% 0.08% 24.1% 
June 11, 2007 to   
October 30, 2007 58.4% 37.6% 0.43% 133.4% 
June 10, 2005 to  
March 9, 2009  53.0% 45.2% -0.02% -6.1% 
 
The table shows the percentage of days with positive and negative returns, the average daily 
returns and returns for the period (annualized) for the periods before and during the bubble 
formation. 
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Table 4. 
Volatility of log returns 
 
97 bubble dot-com bubble 07 bubble 
HSI NASDAQ HSI 
Period 
Volatility of 
log return Period 
Volatility of 
log return Period 
Volatility of 
log return 
July 17, 1995 to 
April 29, 1997 0.01 
August 31, 1998 
to January 4, 2000 0.018 
June 13, 2005 to 
June 11, 2007 0.009 
February 10, 1997 to  
August 7, 1997 0.012 
January 4, 2000 to  
March 10, 2000 0.024 
June 11, 2007 to 
October 30, 2007 0.017 
 
The table shows the volatility of stock returns before and during the bubble formation. 
 
 
Table 5. 
Summary Statistics of Returns 
 
Period 97 bubble (HSI) dot-com bubble 07 bubble  
 1995-1998 1998-2002 2007-2009 
Statistic    
N 764 1010 764 
Mean -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.001 
Median 0.0004 0.0015 0 
Maximum 0.17 0.13 0.13 
Minimum -0.15 -0.1 -0.14 
Variance 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 
Skewness 0.21445 0.14773 0.1523 
Kurtosis 15.45 1.49 4.63 
Jarque-Bera test 4940.1 99.63 87.53 
Runs test <0.0001*** 0.592 <0.0001*** 
Ljung-Box-Pierce Q 
statistics Q(12) 0.165 0.042 0.25 
 
*** p < 1%, ** p < 5% , * p < 10%. 
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Table 6. 
Returns from BH Strategy 
 
Index Period N Mean (R(bh)) Var T p-value 
HSI 1995-1998 764 -0.05% 0.04% -0.68 0.25 
Nasdaq 1998-2002 1010 -0.01% 0.06% -0.18 0.43 
HSI 2007-2009 764 -0.10% 0.07% -1.04 0.15 
BH strategies give negative returns for all three periods. 
N denotes the number of days during each period. 
T is the standard t statistic of whether the mean returns from the buy/hold 
strategy is significantly different from zero. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. 
HSI 1995-1998 Testing Daily Returns of the TA Strategy (under trading rule) 
 
Rule N R T p-value R-R(bh) T' p-value 
MA(5) 655 0.25% 3.15  0.001***  0.30% 2.78  0.003***  
MA(10) 663 0.18% 2.36  0.009***  0.23% 2.19  0.014**  
MA(20) 652 0.19% 2.41  0.008 *** 0.24% 2.23  0.013**  
MA(30) 654 0.12% 1.54  0.062 * 0.17% 1.60  0.055*  
MA(50) 628 0.14% 1.76  0.039 ** 0.19% 1.76  0.039**  
DMA(5,20) 648 0.18% 2.28  0.011 ** 0.23% 2.14  0.016**  
DMA(5,30) 652 0.10% 1.28  0.100 * 0.15% 1.41  0.080*  
EMA(5) 660 0.22% 2.83  0.002 *** 0.27% 2.54  0.006***  
EMA(10) 672 0.18% 2.35  0.010 * 0.23% 2.18  0.015**  
EMA(20) 656 0.17% 2.14  0.016  0.22% 2.04  0.021**  
       ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
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Table 8. 
Nasdaq 1998-2002 Testing Daily Returns of the TA Strategy (under trading rule) 
 
Rule  N R T p-value R-R(bh) T' p-value 
MA(5) 728 0.15% 1.68  0.046** 0.17% 1.40  
         
0.081*  
MA(10) 765 0.15% 1.66  0.048 ** 0.16% 1.37         0.085* 
MA(20) 758 0.19% 2.12  0.017 ** 0.20% 1.72  0.042 ** 
MA(30) 770 0.19% 2.12  0.017 ** 0.20% 1.71  0.043 ** 
MA(50) 723 0.16% 1.71  0.044 ** 0.17% 1.42  0.078 * 
DMA(5,20) 757 0.13% 1.45  0.074 * 0.14% 1.21  0.113  
DMA(5,30) 765 0.20% 2.22  0.013 ** 0.21% 1.79  0.037 ** 
EMA(5) 736 0.15% 1.62  0.052 * 0.16% 1.35  0.088 * 
EMA(10) 745 0.19% 2.11  0.018 ** 0.20% 1.72  0.043 ** 
EMA(20) 771 0.21% 2.38  0.009 *** 0.22% 1.91  0.028 ** 
       *** p < 1%, ** p < 5% , * p < 10%.  
 
 
Table 9. 
HSI 2007-2009 Testing Daily Returns of the TA Strategy 
Rule N R T p-value R-R(bh) T' p-value 
MA(5) 363 0.16% 1.17  0.122  0.26% 1.55  0.061*  
MA(10) 367 0.23% 1.64  0.051 * 0.32% 1.93  0.027 ** 
MA(20) 372 0.23% 1.65  0.050**  0.32% 1.94  0.026 ** 
MA(30) 363 0.31% 2.20  0.014 ** 0.40% 2.40  0.008 *** 
MA(50) 375 0.25% 1.80  0.036 ** 0.34% 2.06  0.020 ** 
DMA(5,20) 371 0.24% 1.78  0.037 ** 0.34% 2.05  0.020 ** 
DMA(5,30) 358 0.25% 1.80  0.036 ** 0.35% 2.07  0.019 ** 
EMA(5) 368 0.20% 1.48  0.070 ** 0.30% 1.80  0.036 ** 
EMA(10) 381 0.21% 1.56  0.059 * 0.31% 1.87  0.031 ** 
EMA(20) 408 0.23% 1.74  0.041 ** 0.33% 2.01  0.022 ** 
      *** p < 1%, ** p < 5% , * p < 10%.  
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Table 10. 
HSI July 14, 1995 to August 31, 1998 
 
Rule Long & short 
 N R(long & short) T p-value R(long & short)-R(bh) T' p-value 
MA(5) 754 0.20% 2.75 0.003*** 0.25% 2.43 0.008*** 
MA(10) 754 0.14% 1.92 0.027 ** 0.10% 0.97 0.165 
MA(20) 732 0.14% 1.89 0.029 ** 0.10% 0.97 0.167 
MA(30) 729 0.07% 0.95 0.172 0.03% 0.29 0.386 
MA(50) 682 0.11% 1.44 0.075 * 0.07% 0.66 0.253 
DMA(5,20) 731 0.14% 1.89 0.029 ** 0.10% 0.97 0.167 
DMA(5,30) 727 0.06% 0.81 0.209 0.02% 0.19 0.423 
EMA(5) 753 0.18% 2.47 0.007 *** 0.14% 1.36 0.086* 
EMA(10) 757 0.14% 1.93 0.027 ** 0.10% 0.97 0.165 
EMA(20) 740 0.12% 1.63 0.051 * 0.08% 0.78 0.219 
 
*, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, 1% significance for returns, respectively. 
Long and short strategies are adopted throughout the whole period, without our trading rule. 
MA families are able to generate significantly positive returns for the period HSI 14/7/95-31/8/98. 
 
 
Table 11. 
NASDAQ August 31, 1998 to September 9, 2002 
 
Rule Long & short 
  N R(long & short) T p-value R(long & short)-R(bh) T' p-value 
MA(5) 1004 0.06% 0.76  0.22  0.07% 0.67  0.25  
MA(10) 1027 0.07% 0.89  0.19  0.08% 0.75  0.23  
MA(20) 989 0.12% 1.58  0.06*  0.14% 1.25  0.11  
MA(30) 980 0.14% 1.79  0.04**  0.15% 1.40  0.08**  
MA(50) 895 0.08% 0.98  0.16  0.09% 0.83  0.20  
DMA(5,20) 987 0.05% 0.69  0.24  0.07% 0.62  0.27  
DMA(5,30) 974 0.13% 1.61  0.05 * 0.14% 1.27  0.10*  
EMA(5) 1002 0.05% 0.66  0.25  0.06% 0.59  0.28  
EMA(10) 991 0.09% 1.20  0.12  0.11% 0.98  0.16  
EMA(20) 996 0.14% 1.78  0.04 ** 0.15% 1.39  0.08*  
 *** p < 1%, ** p < 5% , * p < 10%.  
30 
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Table 12. 
HSI March 5, 2007 to March 31, 2009 
 
Rule Long & short 
 N R(long) T p-value R(long & short)-R(bh) T' p-value 
MA(5) 494 0.07% 0.60  0.27  0.17% 2.41  0.008***  
MA(10) 494 0.09% 0.73  0.23  0.19% 2.63  0.004***  
MA(20) 467 0.11% 0.89  0.19  0.21% 2.72  0.003***  
MA(30) 448 0.22% 1.76  0.04 ** 0.32% 3.97  <0.001***  
MA(50) 445 0.18% 1.44  0.08 * 0.28% 3.44  <0.001***  
DMA(5,20) 464 0.13% 1.07  0.14  0.23% 3.00  0.001***  
DMA(5,30) 446 0.15% 1.17  0.12  0.24% 3.03  0.001***  
EMA(5) 496 0.10% 0.83  0.20  0.20% 2.81  0.002***  
EMA(10) 498 0.06% 0.54  0.29  0.16% 2.33  0.010***  
EMA(20) 497 0.13% 1.10  0.14  0.23% 3.26  0.001***  
  *** p < 1%, ** p < 5% , * p < 10%.  
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Table 13. 
HSI July 14, 1995 to August 31, 1998 
Wealth from TA Strategy (with 0.1% transaction costs) 
 
Rule under trading rule without trading rule  
 Wealth(0.1% cost) Wealth(0.1% cost) Outperformed by 
BH 0.62   
MA(5) 2.52 2.29  10.00% 
MA(10) 2.21 1.99  10.95% 
MA(20) 2.32 2.12  9.43% 
MA(30) 1.67 1.42 17.69% 
MA(50) 1.84 1.77  4.20% 
DMA(5,20) 2.37 2.21  7.24% 
DMA(5,30) 1.61 1.39  15.58% 
EMA(5) 2.34 2.12  10.38% 
EMA(10) 2.19 1.97  11.38% 
EMA(20) 2.10 1.88  11.90% 
 
A portfolio of $1M is set up at the beginning of the three periods. Transaction costs are 
assumed to equal 0.1% of the value of the trade. Under our trading rule, long and short 
strategy is adopted from the low point of the bull market up to the point when the stock index 
dropped from its peak to below the predicted stock index Pred Zt Price (cf. Figures 1-3). 
Thereafter, a short strategy is taken until the stock price breaks the downward trend ABC by 
passing through point C. In the absence of a trading rule, long and short strategies are adopted 
throughout the whole period. As Tables 11 to 13 show, the bubble detection signals enable 
investors to generate 7% to 68% greater wealth than ?. 
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Table 14. 
NASDAQ August 31, 1998 to September 9, 2002  
Wealth from TA Strategy (with 0.1% transaction costs) 
 
Rule under trading rule without trading rule  
 Wealth (0.1% cost) Wealth (0.1% cost) Outperformed by 
BH 0.86   
MA(5) 1.71 1.07  60.15% 
MA(10) 1.95 1.30  49.84% 
MA(20) 2.48 2.17  14.27% 
MA(30) 2.43 2.32  4.92% 
MA(50) 2.16 1.77  22.27% 
DMA(5,20) 1.93 1.49  29.68% 
DMA(5,30) 2.84 2.48  14.31% 
EMA(5) 1.70 1.01  67.90% 
EMA(10) 2.34 1.61  45.30% 
EMA(20) 2.78 2.39  16.42% 
 
 
Table 15. 
HSI March 5, 2007 to March 31, 2009  
Wealth from TA Strategy (with 0.1% transaction costs) 
 
Rule under trading rule without trading rule  
 Wealth (0.1% cost) Wealth(0.1% cost) Outperformed by 
BH 0.24    
MA(5) 1.30 1.01  28.76% 
MA(10) 1.76 1.29  36.29% 
MA(20) 1.88 1.48  26.77% 
MA(30) 2.25 2.08  8.23% 
MA(50) 1.95 1.76  10.80% 
DMA(5,20) 2.00 1.66  20.27% 
DMA(5,30) 1.97 1.72  14.33% 
EMA(5) 1.54 1.17  31.64% 
EMA(10) 1.67 1.13  47.77% 
EMA(20) 1.92 1.60  20.15% 
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Figure 1A.  Time Series Plot of Hang Sang Index with Prediction for 1997 Bubble. 
HSI moving regression 94-97
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Figure 1B.  Time Series Plot of Nasdaq with Prediction for dot-com Bubble. 
Nasdaq moving regression: 98-02
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Figure 1C.  Time Series Plot of Hang Seng Index with Prediction for 07 Bubble. 
HSI moving regression: 07-08
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Note:  Zt denotes the stock index. Predict Zt Price is the predicted stock price from a linear 
regression. Pred Zt Price +1SD (-1SD) is the predicted stock price 1 standard deviation above 
(below) from Predict Zt Price. 
 
